We derive a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade integration that is consistent with a broad range of leading gravity models. This measure accounts for cross-industry heterogeneity by incorporating substitution elasticities estimated at the industry level. We then use it to provide a theory-based ranking of trade integration across manufacturing industries in European Union countries. In addition, we explore the determinants of trade integration, …nding that substantial Technical Barriers to Trade in certain industries as well as high transportation costs associated with heavy-weight goods are the most notable trade barriers.
Introduction
Trade costs are a staple ingredient in today's trade literature. They feature prominently in the vast majority of theoretical papers. Broadly de…ned, trade costs include any cost of engaging in international trade such as transportation costs, tari¤s, non-tari¤ barriers, informational costs, time costs and di¤erent product standards, among others. In addition, a growing empirical literature, surveyed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) , is devoted to exploring the sources and size of trade costs. A deeper understanding of the causes of trade costs is important because it would enable a better evaluation of their welfare implications. These are suspected to be large: on their own, policy-related trade costs may be worth more than ten percent of national income (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2002) .
A major challenge faced by empirical researchers is to measure overall trade costs since "direct measures are remarkably sparse and inaccurate" (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, p. 692) . Direct measures are only available for a few components, for instance transportation and insurance costs, usually proxied by the ratio of c.i.f. and f.o.b. trade values (Harrigan, 1993 , Hummels, 2001a , 2007 , policy barriers such as speci…c tari¤ or non-tari¤ barriers (Chen, 2004 , Harrigan, 1993 , Head and Mayer, 2000 , informational costs (Rauch, 1999) or time costs (Evans and Harrigan, 2005 , Harrigan, 2010 , Hummels, 2001b . 1 But even for those components, data coverage is often limited to a few countries and years, and it can be hard to gather disaggregated trade cost data at the industry or product level.
Given those di¢culties in obtaining accurate measures of trade costs, some researchers indirectly infer the level of trade impediments from trade ‡ows. One way of doing this is to use the "phi-ness" of trade to estimate "border e¤ects," which mostly re ‡ect the extent of border-related costs (Head and Ries, 2001 , Baldwin et al., 2003 , Head and Mayer, 2004 . 2 This indirect approach has the obvious advantage of extending the analysis to more countries, years and more …nely disaggregated data. This paper is part of the research e¤ort that attempts to indirectly infer trade impediments from trade ‡ows. Following the lead of Head and Ries (2001) and Head and Mayer (2004) , the …rst contribution of the paper is to develop a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade integration that can be applied to disaggregated panel data and that can be computed from observable trade and output data. We derive this measure by modeling disaggregated trade ‡ows at the industry level in the gravity framework pioneered by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) , allowing trade costs to be heterogeneous across industries. In contrast to the phi-ness measure, our measure of bilateral trade integration accounts for heterogeneity across industries by incorporating industry-speci…c substitution elasticities.
Arguably, the Anderson and van Wincoop monopolistic competition model is one of the most parsimonious trade models of recent years. It rests on the Armington assumption that countries produce di¤erentiated goods and trade is driven by consumers' love of variety, leading to the key gravity equation. However, we extend the micro-foundations of the trade integration measure by showing that an isomorphic measure can also be derived from other models. These include the Ricardian trade model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Chaney's (2008) extension of the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous …rms model as well as the heterogeneous …rms model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with linear non-CES demand. This is possible because all these models lead to gravity equations that have a similar structure. Our approach is therefore consistent with a broad range of the recent theoretical trade literature.
The second contribution of the paper is to bring our measure of trade integration to the data. This enables us to document and explain the variation of trade barriers across 163 manufacturing industries in 11 European Union (EU) countries over the period [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . The case of the EU is appealing since trade integration is expected to be strong among its member states for two reasons. First, these countries have succeeded in dismantling many restrictions on trade, including tari¤s and quotas that were completely eliminated by 1968. Second, the situation has been further reinforced by the implementation of the Single Market Programme (SMP), launched in the mid-1980s.
As they are required for the trade integration measure, we …rst estimate the substitution elasticities across the 163 manufacturing industries using the estimation approach pioneered by Feenstra (1994) and adapted by Broda and Weinstein (2006) and Imbs and Méjean (2009) . As expected, we …nd that the elasticities vary substantially across industries. We then construct our trade integration measure and obtain a theory-based ranking of industries with intuitive results. For example, trade integration appears particularly low for "Bricks," "Plaster" and "Cement" as these industries are characterized by high transportation costs. Trade integration also tends to be low for perishable goods such as "Bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes." On the contrary, industries that are well integrated include a number of high-tech industries such as "Aircraft and spacecraft," "Engines and turbines" and "Computers." Our ranking is thus potentially useful to policymakers who wish to identify industries with poor trade integration.
As the next step, we attempt to explain the variation of trade integration both across countries and industries. Consistent with the standard gravity literature, the variation of trade integration across countries can to a large extent be captured by typical gravity variables such as distance and adjacency but also by policy-related variables such as participation in the Schengen Agreement. But our focus lies on the substantial degree of heterogeneity in trade integration across industries. Our results con…rm that modeling trade costs as a "one-size-…ts-all" impediment is clearly at odds with empirical evidence.
In particular, we investigate the role of several industry characteristics in explaining trade integration across industries, with an emphasis on policy-related variables such as the extent of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs). Such barriers are a predominant concern in today's global trade negotiations, and for the WTO in particular as it precisely seeks to ensure that "technical regulations and standards, including packaging, marking and labelling requirements [...] do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade." 3 We …nd that trade integration is indeed lower in industries where TBTs are strong, suggesting that there is room left for policy action and that further increases in market integration are possible through the reduction of those barriers. We also show that trade integration tends to be high for industries characterized by high productivity, low transportation costs and a high degree of transparency in public procurement.
Finally, we contrast our methodology with alternative approaches. We believe this yields important insights. First, it is well-known that in standard gravity regressions of bilateral trade ‡ows, the estimated coe¢cient on a trade cost proxy such as bilateral distance is a combination of the distance elasticity of trade costs and the elasticity of substitution (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, Hummels, 2001a) . The distance elasticity of trade costs can only be derived once the substitution elasticity is known. However, in contrast to our measure, gravity equations cannot deliver a ranking that captures the extent of trade barriers across industries.
Second, although the phi-ness approach to proxy for trade barriers is conceptually closer to our methodology, it also struggles to deliver a meaningful ranking. The reason is that the phi-ness approach compares industries only by considering simple trade ratios, thus neglecting other features that might vary across industries such as the substitutability of goods and the degree of competition. In contrast, the trade integration measure that we employ embodies the substitution elasticities estimated at an earlier stage. It is thus able to separate di¤erences in trade barriers from other forms of heterogeneity across industries, making it useful to quantify the extent of trade barriers across industries. Finally and perhaps most importantly, we …nd that the di¤erent approaches lead to con ‡icting policy conclusions. For example, we are able to identify TBTs as a major trade impediment, while the gravity and phi-ness frameworks do not.
Closest to our work are recent papers modeling and measuring trade barriers at the disaggregate level of industries. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) model disaggregated trade ‡ows and explicitly allow trade costs to vary at the industry level. Head and Ries (2001) and Head and Mayer (2004) rely on the phi-ness approach to measure and explain trade barriers across industries. 4 We di¤er from this literature in that the measure of trade impediments we propose incorporates industry-speci…c substitution elasticities which, as we argue, are important in capturing cross-industry variation that is distinct from variation in trade costs. This allows us to provide a ranking of trade integration across industries which the gravity and phi-ness approaches cannot deliver.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we use the monopolistic competition model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) to derive the trade integration measure. We also show that the measure is consistent with other types of leading trade models. In addition, we conceptually and empirically contrast our methodology with the standard gravity and phi-ness approaches. In section 3 we present our data set, estimate the elasticities of substitution and present the ranking of trade integration across industries. In section 4 we explain the variation of trade integration by relating it to observable trade cost proxies, draw policy implications and provide robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
A Model with Industry-Speci…c Trade Costs
In their seminal paper, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) set up a general equilibrium model of trade that results in a micro-founded gravity equation. We closely follow Anderson and van Wincoop's (2004) generalization in which they model bilateral trade for individual industries characterized by industry-speci…c bilateral trade costs and industry-speci…c elasticities of substitution. 5 Our interest lies on the industry-speci…c trade cost variables. Following the approach by Head and Ries (2001) , we derive an analytical solution for them that depends on observable variables only. This solution gives rise to a micro-founded measure of industry-speci…c bilateral trade integration. In addition we demonstrate the generality of this trade integration measure. In particular, we show that it is consistent with leading trade theories including the Ricardian trade model by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Chaney's (2008) extension of the Melitz (2003) heterogeneous …rms model as well as the heterogeneous …rms model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) .
The Basic Framework
Denote    as nominal exports from country  to country  in goods associated with industry . Suppose that consumers in country  allocate expenditure    on industry- goods and that their preferences over these goods can be described by a standard CES utility function. The elasticity of substitution   is speci…c to industry  and assumed to exceed unity,    1. Furthermore, suppose that the factory gate price of industry- goods from country  is denoted by    and that trade costs associated with the trade cost factor   ¸1 are incurred when these goods are shipped to country  such that the price faced by country- consumers, denoted by    , can be written as
Imposing market-clearing and solving for general equilibrium, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) derive the following gravity equation for industry :
Trade ‡ows    depend on supply    of the -good from country  and expenditure    for the good in country  relative to world output   in industry . Large bilateral trade costs    reduce bilateral trade, whereas large average outward trade barriers of country  (i.e., large ¦   , or outward multilateral resistance) and large average inward trade barriers of country  (i.e., large    , or inward multilateral resistance) lead to more bilateral trade.
A problem that arises in empirical work is that we do not have data for the multilateral resistance terms    and ¦   in gravity equation (1). The method we employ here is to solve for these terms analytically as a function of observable trade ‡ows. We exploit the fact that multilateral resistance is related to the amount of trade a country conducts with itself (see Novy, 2011) . Intuitively, if a country's trade barriers with the rest of the world are high (i.e., if the country's multilateral resistance is high), the country will trade a lot domestically.
To see this formally, we use gravity equation (1) and consider domestic trade ‡ows for industry- goods
where    are domestic trade costs for industry- goods, for example domestic transportation costs. Equation (2) can be solved for the product of outward and inward multilateral resistance as
Note that we do not impose zero domestic trade costs since the trade cost factor    may exceed unity.
A Micro-Founded Measure of Industry-Speci…c Trade Integration
The solution for multilateral resistance can be exploited to solve the model. Gravity equation (1) contains the product of outward multilateral resistance of country  and inward multilateral resistance of country , ¦      , whereas equation (3) provides a solution for ¦      . It is therefore useful to multiply gravity equation (1) by the corresponding gravity equation for trade ‡ows in the opposite direction,    , to obtain a bidirectional gravity equation that contains both countries' outward and inward multilateral resistance variables. This yields
We substitute the solution for multilateral resistance given in equation (3) to obtain
Following Head and Ries (2001) and Head and Mayer (2004) , it is easy to solve for the trade cost factors as
It is only possible to infer relative trade costs, in this case bilateral trade costs       relative to intranational trade costs       . 6 We do not impose trade cost symmetry so that    and    on the left-hand side of equation (6) may be asymmetric (   6 =    ). However, as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, footnote 11) point out, it is problematic to infer the degree of trade barrier asymmetry from trade data because there are multiple combinations of    and    that can give rise to the same trade ‡ows    and    . Given this caveat from theory, we are unable to identify trade cost asymmetries. Instead, we take the square root to get an expression for the average bilateral relative trade barrier. 6 On this point also see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, p. 709) .
It can be expressed as
We interpret    as a micro-founded measure of bilateral industry-speci…c trade frictions, or the inverse of bilateral trade integration. The more two countries trade with each other (i.e., the higher       ), the lower is our measure of relative trade frictions ceteris paribus. Conversely, if the two countries start trading more domestically (i.e., the higher       ), the higher is our measure of relative trade frictions ceteris paribus.
For the interpretation of    it is also helpful to think of two opposite extreme cases -a frictionless world with no trade costs on the one hand, and a closed economy on the other. In a frictionless world, all trade cost factors equal unity (   =    =    =    = 1) and    would be one. In the case approaching a closed economy, bilateral trade       tends towards zero and thus    tends towards in…nity, implying that bilateral barriers are prohibitive relative to domestic barriers.
Importantly, the de…nition of    combines the ratio of domestic to bilateral trade with an exponent that involves the industry-speci…c elasticity of substitution   . Intuitively, in an industry with a high elasticity   , consumers are so price-sensitive that all else being equal, a fairly small price di¤erence induced by bilateral trade costs can lead to a high ratio of domestic over bilateral trade. Therefore this ratio does not only re ‡ect high bilateral trade barriers but also a low degree of product di¤erentiation.    is precisely able to separate this competition, or heterogeneity e¤ect, from the trade barrier e¤ect. As equation (7) shows, a higher elasticity of substitution implies lower trade frictions    .
Finally, we stress that non-unitary income elasticities in gravity equations, as found by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) , do not pose a problem for our methodology. It is straightforward to show that if the elasticities of    and    in equation (1) di¤ered from unity, the same trade integration measure    as in equation (7) would follow. 7
Deriving the Trade Integration Measure from Alternative Models
We have derived    in equation (7) from a model based on a CES demand system in combination with the Armington assumption that goods are di¤erentiated by country of origin. In fact, our trade integration measure is valid more generally beyond this particular framework. We now show that it can also be derived from a range of other leading trade theories. As before, we apply these theories at the industry level, denoted by the index . Eaton and Kortum (2002) In the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) , productivity in each country is drawn from a Fréchet distribution that has two parameters,    and   .    determines the location of the productivity distribution for country  in industry  with a high    denoting high overall productivity.    1 denotes the variation of productivity across goods and is treated as common across countries, with a high   denoting little variation. The model yields a gravity equation whose structure is similar to equation (1). It is given by
where    denotes the input cost in country  and industry . We are interested in the trade cost parameters.    and    are unobservable but cancel out once the ratio of domestic over bilateral trade ‡ows is formed as in equation (7). This yields
Comparing equations (7) and (8), it is obvious that 
As before, a low degree of heterogeneity (i.e., a high   ) implies low trade barriers.
Chaney (2008) Chaney (2008) builds on the seminal paper by Melitz (2003) and derives a gravity equation based on a model with heterogeneous productivity across …rms and …xed costs of exporting. The two assumptions of heterogeneous …rms and …xed costs of exporting introduce an extensive margin of trade. Exporters do not only vary the size of shipments in response to trade cost changes (the intensive margin), but the set of exporters also changes (the extensive margin). Chaney derives the following industry-level gravity equation:
where   is the weight of industry  in the consumers' utility function,   is total income of country ,  is world income,   is workers' productivity in country ,    is a remoteness variable akin to multilateral resistance and    are the …xed costs of exporting from country  to .   is the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution, with a high   denoting a low degree of heterogeneity and      ¡ 1. Forming the ratio of domestic over bilateral trade ‡ows yields
Thus, the trade integration measure    is a function of both variable and …xed trade costs. 9 A low degree of heterogeneity (i.e., a high   ) again implies low trade barriers. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also model heterogeneous …rms. But in contrast to Chaney (2008) , …rms face …xed costs of market entry   that can be interpreted as 8 For more details on the comparison of Armington-type and Ricardian models, see Eaton and Kortum (2002, footnote 20) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, pp. 709-710) .
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
9 For non-zero trade ‡ows (as is generally the case in our sample) and particular parameter restrictions in the productivity distribution,    is also consistent with the model by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) . product development and production start-up costs. When exporting, the …rms only face variable trade costs and no …xed costs of exporting. The model is based on non-CES preferences that give rise to endogenous markups. More speci…cally, markups tend to be low in large markets with many competitors. Their multiple country model leads to the following gravity equation:
where  is a parameter from the utility function that indicates the degree of product di¤erentiation (a higher  means a higher degree of di¤erentiation).    is the number of entrants in country .   is an index of comparative advantage in technology. A high   means that entrants in country  have a high chance of obtaining good productivity draws.   denotes the number of consumers in country .    is the marginal cost cut-o¤ above which domestic …rms in country  do not produce. The intuition is that tougher competition in country , re ‡ected by a lower    , makes it harder for exporters from  to break into that market. Forming the ratio of domestic over bilateral trade ‡ows yields have in common that they scale the ratio of domestic over bilateral trade ‡ows by parameters that indicate a particular form of heterogeneity. A low   in equation (7) indicates a high degree of di¤erentiation across products; a low   in equation (8) indicates a high variation of productivity across products; and a low   in equations (9) and (10) indicates a high degree of …rm heterogeneity. For given trade ‡ows, higher heterogeneity therefore implies higher trade frictions. Intuitively, suppose we observe two industries with the same ratio of domestic over bilateral trade but one industry is characterized by a higher degree of heterogeneity. With higher heterogeneity countries produce goods that are more di¤erent from each other or re ‡ect larger di¤erences in comparative advantage. Thus, consumers should have a larger incentive to trade. The fact that consumers do not trade more implies that trade frictions must be higher in that industry.
The reason why our trade integration measure    is consistent with a broad range of trade models is related to the fact that they all lead to gravity equations that have a structure similar to equation (1). Intuitively, the gravity equation is an expenditure equation that indicates how consumers allocate their expenditure across countries subject to trade frictions (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) . Gravity equations arise regardless of why consumers want to buy goods from foreign countries. In an Armington world, 10 The fact that our approach works in this context is due to several particular features of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model. First, the productivity cut-o¤ for the marginal exporter to a certain destination market is a multiplicative function of bilateral trade costs and the domestic cut-o¤ in that destination market. Second, due to the linear demand system an individual exporter's revenue is also a multiplicative function of (the square of) bilateral trade costs. Third, the assumption of a Pareto distribution for productivity ensures that aggregate revenue from exporting to the destination market is a simple multiplicative function of bilateral trade costs raised to the power of the Pareto shape parameter. We stress that we do not make any additional assumptions to make our approach work with this model. consumers buy foreign goods because those goods are inherently di¤erent and consumers prefer variety. In a Ricardian world, countries produce goods according to comparative advantage and consumers buy foreign goods because they are cheaper. It turns out that the particular motivation behind foreign trade is not crucial for understanding the role of trade frictions. 11
More generally, the method of considering ratios of domestic and bilateral trade ‡ows is expected to work in models whose trade equations link origin-speci…c variables, destination-speci…c variables and country pair speci…c trade costs in a multiplicative way. These also include the models by Anderson (1979) and Krugman (1980) . By taking the appropriate trade ratio as, for instance, in equation (7) one can ensure that all exporter-speci…c and importer-speci…c terms cancel and only bilateral trade cost variables remain.
How We Di¤er from Other Approaches
Finally we explain how our method di¤ers empirically from other approaches such as the gravity equation and the phi-ness of trade which is commonly used to evaluate the extent of trade frictions (Head and Ries, 2001 , Baldwin et al., 2003 , Head and Mayer, 2004 . We describe how our measure di¤ers conceptually from the other two approaches. In particular, we show that in contrast to gravity and phi-ness,    is able to measure and rank trade frictions across countries and industries as it distinguishes between the e¤ect of trade barriers and the e¤ect of heterogeneity. We believe this is an important feature.
The Gravity Equation Dropping time subscripts for simplicity, we start with a micro-founded gravity speci…cation that can be obtained by log-linearizing equation (4):
As is now commonly done in the literature (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) , to control for the unobservable multilateral resistance variables ¦      ¦      we need to include …xed e¤ects for each industry in each year and separately for countries  and , denoted by    and    . Thus, equation (4) becomes:
To keep the exposition as simple as possible, assume that bilateral trade costs depend on distance 11 Deardor¤ (1998) argues that in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, trade frictions prevent factor price equalization so that for the large majority of goods, only one country is the lowest-cost producer. In the presence of trade frictions, trade in a Heckscher-Ohlin world therefore resembles trade in an Armington world. Grossman (1998) provides the following intuition for the gravity equation: "Specialization lies behind the explanatory power [of the gravity equation], and of course some degree of specialization is at the heart of any model of trade. Thus, the derivation of the gravity equation need not make reference to any particular trade model at all [...] This is true no matter what supply-side considerations give rise to the specialization, be they increasing returns to scale in a world of di¤erentiated products, technology di¤erences in a world of Ricardian trade, large factor endowment di¤erences in a world of Heckscher-Ohlin trade, or (small) transport costs in a world of any type of endowment-based trade." (Emphasis in the original.) only, i.e., ln (11) can be estimated as:
where    denotes an error term. This micro-founded gravity equation only allows us to estimate the industry-speci…c elasticities of trade with respect to distance,   . These are the product of the elasticities of substitution (1¡  ) and the elasticities of the "true" trade costs with respect to distance   (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, Hummels, 2001a) .
Only once the elasticities of substitution   are observed can the elasticities of trade costs with respect to distance be retrieved as
But even in that case, the variation in trade costs       is still unknown since the   's do not provide any ranking of trade integration across industries. 12 As the gravity equation is unable to disentangle the heterogeneity e¤ect from the trade barrier e¤ect, it is impossible to quantify and compare trade frictions across countries and industries. 13 The Phi -ness of Trade The (inverse) phi -ness of trade, denoted by    , is de…ned as the simple ratio of domestic to bilateral trade ‡ows. Equation (5) allows us to directly derive an expression for (inverse) phi-ness:
Assuming that domestic trade costs also only depend on distance, i.e., ln
equation (13) can be estimated as:
where    denotes an error term. The elasticities of trade costs with respect to distance can be computed as
But similar to gravity equation (12), the variation and ranking in trade costs are still unknown. The phi-ness estimation approach is thus inappropriate to capture the variation in trade frictions across countries and industries (and therefore to determine which countries or industries are more or less integrated). 14 12 It is impossible to determine whether, for instance, "Concrete products" are more or less integrated than "Bricks." 13 Also, as correctly speci…ed gravity equations like (12) to control for multilateral resistance, a practical problem is that these …xed e¤ects are perfectly collinear with many explanatory variables of interest that only vary across sectors and over time. With our approach we avoid this problem because    nets out the time-varying multilateral resistance variables. 14 But in contrast to gravity equation (12), the phi -ness estimation approach nets out multilateral resistance variables so that time-varying country/industry …xed e¤ects do not have to be included. 
where    denotes an error term. While the   and   coe¢cients can be indirectly derived from the gravity and phi-ness approaches, with    they can be estimated directly. 15 But most importantly, it is now possible to evaluate trade frictions across countries and industries as 
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Trade and Output Data
To compute our measure of trade integration    across industries, countries and time, we need the domestic trade of countries  and  in industry ,    and    , as well as their bilateral exports,    and    , at time . As in previous literature (for instance, Chen, 2004 , Evans, 2003 , Head and Mayer, 2000 , Nitsch, 2000 , Wei, 1996 , domestic trade for country  is given by its gross output in industry ,    , minus total exports of country  to the rest of the world in that industry. Our sample includes trade ‡ows for 163 manufacturing industries across 11 EU countries at the 4-digit NACE Rev.1 level between 1999 and 2003. The sample is balanced over time. The 11 countries are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In the data appendix we provide a detailed description of the data and their sources. 161718 Our data set comprises a total of 15,145 domestic and bilateral trade ‡ow observations. Only three bilateral trade ‡ows are equal to zero, which is not surprising given the huge volume of intra-industry trade in the EU. 19 Those three cases would normally feature as missing values of    . But zero trade ‡ows may contain valuable information as to why such low levels of trade are observed. It therefore seems more appropriate to associate these cases with large trade frictions. The approach we adopt is to replace the zeros with a value of one Euro, leading to large values of    . 15 Here,   and   are divided by 2 because    is the average trade barrier, i.e., we take the square root of . 16 Due to data limitations not all possible trade ‡ow combinations across industries and countries are available. Although it would in principle be possible to span the longer period from 1997 to 2003, this would come at the cost of losing all observations for Germany, a core EU country, because German sectoral output data are missing prior to 1999. 17 Manufacturing is split into 217 industries at the 4-digit NACE level while our sample only includes 163. Missing data for gross output values (required to compute domestic trade ‡ows) in a single or several years between 1999 and 2003 is the reason why some industries are excluded from the analysis. 18 The data appendix is available online at www.warwick.ac.uk/go/nachen. 19 The zero trade ‡ows are observed in "Publishing of newspapers" and twice in "Mattresses." We consider those observations as "true zeros" because the corresponding output values are positive whereas exports are zero. We exclude the cases where output is zero but exports are positive as well as the cases where both output and exports are zero. Feenstra (1994) develops a methodology to estimate disaggregated substitution elasticities using data on imported quantities and prices (unit values). He estimates a demand schedule for US sectors where the   's are derived by Instrumental Variables (IV) using country-sector …xed e¤ects as instruments. Identi…cation thus depends on the cross-section of exporters and is achieved in deviation from a reference country. This methodology can sometimes generate estimates that do not match any of the theoretically plausible values for   . To solve this issue, Broda and Weinstein (2006) propose a grid search algorithm that minimizes the sum of squared residuals over the intervals of plausible values. Imbs and Méjean (2009) implement Feenstra's (1994) methodology as well as Broda and Weinstein's (2006) grid search algorithm in which case the standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions. However, they do not estimate the   's at the …nest level of disaggregation of the data. Using disaggregated trade data at the 6-digit HS level they instead estimate the elasticities at the 3-digit ISIC Rev.3 level, assuming that all HS products are equally substitutable within an ISIC industry but not between. They also employ a correction suggested by Pesaran (2006) to control for aggregate shocks in exporting countries that a¤ect all sectors simultaneously.
Elasticities of Substitution
We closely follow Imbs and Méjean (2009) and estimate the elasticities   at the 4-digit NACE Rev.1 level using highly disaggregated trade data at the 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN) level, assuming that all CN products are equally substitutable within a NACE industry. The trade data, taken from the same source as the data used to compute the ratio between domestic and bilateral trade ‡ows, are the bilateral imports of the 11 EU countries from 46 developed and developing countries between 1999 and 2003 at the CN level. 20 But in contrast to Imbs and Méjean (2009) who estimate   's that are speci…c to a destination market (i.e., the US), we constrain the elasticities to be the same for all 11 EU importing countries. 21 As a result, identi…cation depends on the cross-section of exporters, importers and products.
The …rst column in Table 1 reports the elasticities   estimated for each industry . On average,   is equal to 7.1, with values ranging from 1.8 to 41.2 and a standard deviation of 4.3. The median value is equal to 6.2, suggesting that the distribution of the elasticities is skewed to the right (5 out of 163 estimates are above 15). The distribution of those elasticities is depicted in Figure 1 . Those results con…rm the well-known fact that elasticities are heterogeneous across industries, and are substantially larger the more disaggregated the data, re ‡ecting that disaggregated quantities are more responsive to import prices than aggregate quantities.
The   's are crucial to determine the level of inferred trade frictions    as well as their ranking across industries. It is therefore important to show that our elasticities are comparable to other estimates reported in the literature. Given that we use the methodology implemented by Imbs and Méjean (2009) , we should expect our estimates to display some similarities with theirs, and they do. The   's by Imbs and Méjean (2009) that match with 159 of our 163 industries (i.e., 44 out of the 56 20 The reason why our main analysis is conducted at the industry and not at the product level is the unavailability of product level output data that are required to compute    . 21 For the sake of comparison, we also estimated elasticities that vary across importing countries,    , as in Imbs and Méjean (2009) . The correlations between those elasticities and the constrained elasticities used to compute    are all positive but not perfect. elasticities they estimate) range from 3.1 to 24.3 with an average of 4.9, a standard deviation of 1.9 and a median of 4.5. Their industries are more aggregated than ours, which explains why their elasticities are on average slightly smaller. But most importantly, notable similarities with our estimates can be identi…ed. For instance, for "Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles" (ISIC 1730) they estimate an elasticity of 5.10 against our elasticity of 4.93 for "Knitted and crocheted pullovers and cardigans" (NACE 1772). Also, for "Man-made …bres" (ISIC 2430 and NACE 2470) their elasticity of 5.36 directly compares to our estimate of 5.58. Divergences can however also be found. For instance, for "Aircraft and spacecraft" (ISIC 3530) their estimate of 24.30 contrasts with the value of 6.72 we …nd for the corresponding EU industry (NACE 3530).
A comparison with the   's estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) at the 5-digit SITC Rev.3 level can be performed, too. 22 Among the SITC elasticities that match with our EU industries (i.e., 1,555 out of the 2,716 elasticities they estimate), their   's range from 1.1 to 16,049 with an average of 16.4, a standard deviation of 407 and a median of 2.6. Here, the more disaggregated nature of their estimates explains why they are on average larger, but similarities with our   's can still be found. For instance, for "Butadiene rubber" (SITC 232.12), a variety of synthetic rubber, they estimate an elasticity of 6.36 against our elasticity of 6.37 for "Synthetic rubber" (NACE 2417). Also, the elasticities for "Cocoa paste, not defatted" (SITC 72.31) and "Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery" (NACE 1584) are equal to 7.69 and 7.67, respectively. Conversely, leaving aside an outlier value of 16,049 among their estimates, discrepancies between the two sets of elasticities can also be found, such as in "Motorcycles" (SITC 785.16) where their elasticity of 119.28 contrasts with our elasticity of 10.98 (NACE 3541).
Overall, despite the similarities between our estimates and those reported by Imbs and Méjean (2009) or Broda and Weinstein (2006) , we believe that our elasticities are more appropriate in order to measure    as they are estimated for the same sample of EU countries, the same time period and at the same level of disaggregation as the trade data we use to construct bilateral trade integration.
Trade Frictions
The second column in Table 1 (7), which shows that a higher elasticity   is associated with lower implied trade frictions, the correlation between (log)   and   is equal to -49 percent, suggesting that our ranking of trade integration across industries is substantially driven by the elasticities of substitution. Another way to evaluate the importance of   for the trade 22 We do not compare our results to Feenstra (1994) as he reports estimates for six manufacturing products only.
integration measure is to perform a variance decomposition. After regressing (log)   on its elasticity component 12(  ¡ 1) and its trade component given by the average (log inverse) phi-ness of trade   for each industry, the decomposition shows that the contribution to the variance of (log)   is 82 percent for the elasticity component and only 11 percent for the phi-ness component. 2324 The negative relationship between (log)   and   is represented in Figure 3 .
A …rst cursory glance at Table 1 attests the intuitive nature of the trade integration measure    . Trade integration is lowest for "Bricks," followed by "Plaster" and "Plate-making." "Bricks" and "Plaster" are characterized by large weight-to-value ratios, indicating a very low transportability of the goods. Other related industries are "Cement" and "Concrete products." Note that the geographic market for cement and concrete is locally con…ned since the perishable nature of such "wet" products constrains the distance over which they can be delivered. Other industries with low trade integration include "Bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes" due to their perishable nature. "Publishing of newspapers" is traded very little, too, which is hardly surprising given the reliance of such products on speci…c languages. This …nding is consistent with earlier studies showing that trade in such sectors is subdued. For instance, Harrigan (1996) shows that the volume of trade relative to output in the OECD in 1985 is the lowest in "Printing and Publishing." At the other end, industries that are well integrated include a number of high-tech industries such as "Aircraft and spacecraft," "Engines and turbines," "Accumulators," "Agricultural tractors," "Electric motors," "Computers," "Motor vehicles," "Machinery for textile production" and the like.
A crucial advantage of the   measure is to provide a theory-based ranking of trade integration across industries. For example, "Plaster," "Cement" and "Mortars" are all similar, poorly integrated industries with a high weight-to-value. But it is hard to determine, a priori, which is the most integrated. The   measure precisely allows us to answer this question and reveals that the least integrated of the three is "Plaster" while the most integrated is "Mortars." Also, although "Imitation jewellery" and "Leather clothes" produce low weight-to-value products, they are less integrated than the high weight-to-value industry "Mortars." This suggests they are both hampered by signi…cant trade barriers other than transportation costs.
Finally, as (inverse) phi-ness is a component of    , the two measures are naturally expected to be correlated with each other. Column (3) in Table 1 reports the inverse phi-ness of trade for each industry   . The correlation between   and   (in logs) is equal to 51 percent (as depicted in Figure   4 ) while their rank correlation reaches 66 percent. 25 It therefore follows that the two measures yield roughly similar insights regarding trade integration across industries. For example, "Bricks" and "Striking of coins" are consistently among the less integrated industries while "O¢ce machinery" and "Other purpose machinery" are among the most integrated.
23 By de…nition, ln    = 1 (2(  ¡ 1)) ln    . 24 We repeated the same exercise using as a dependent variable (log)    . Depending on the speci…cations (no …xed e¤ects or with 3-digit, exporter, importer or pair …xed e¤ects, interacted or not with year dummies), the contributions from the variance in the elasticity component vary between 60 and 63 percent while the contributions from the variance in (inverse) phi-ness vary between 29 and 32 percent. The contribution of the variance of each component  to the total variance of the dependent variable  is calculated as  =    (  )  ( ), where   is the partial regression coe¢cient of  on the explanatory variable   , holding all other explanatory variables constant (Fields, 2003) . 25 The ranking of each industry according to the two measures is reported in parentheses in the last two columns of Table 1. Our trade integration measure would only coincide with the (inverse) phi-ness of trade if we assumed that the elasticity of substitution were equal to 1.5 for all industries such that 12(  ¡1) = 1 for all  in equation (7). 26 But this assumption would clearly be at odds with the …ndings of the recent literature (Imbs and Méjean, 2009 , Broda and Weinstein, 2006 , Feenstra, 1994 as well as with our own estimates. Most importantly, this assumption a¤ects the conclusions regarding trade integration across industries. As can be seen from Table 1 , "Workwear" and "Basic pharmaceutical products" appear to be highly integrated according to   but poorly integrated according to   . The opposite is true for "Ceramic sanitary …xtures." In terms of rankings,   indicates that "Bricks" is less integrated than "Publishing of newspapers" while   suggests the opposite. The same observation applies to "Cement" and "Concrete products," among other industries.
To conclude, even if   and   are correlated with each other, they are di¤erent because   has a feature (the   's) that   misses, and this di¤erence matters not only in theory but also in the data. In contrast to    , phi-ness is unable to distinguish between the trade barrier e¤ect and the heterogeneity e¤ect, as captured by the elasticity of substitution   .
The Determinants of Bilateral Trade Integration

Our Trade Integration Measure
We now examine formally how the trade integration measure performs in the data. To analyze the factors that correlate with bilateral EU trade integration across countries and industries we estimate
where    is a set of variables related to geography and transportation costs,     is a set of policy-related factors,    includes other types of costs such as …xed costs of exporting and productivity, and    includes variables controlling for measurement issues. Given that some of the explanatory variables as well as the elasticity of substitution embedded in    vary across 4-digit industries only, we include industry …xed e¤ects   at the more aggregated level of 3-digit industries, assuming that the 4-digit groupings  are di¤erent varieties of the corresponding, more aggregated 3-digit sector  (Hummels, 2001a) . The inclusion of other explanatory variables that only vary across country pairs precludes us from controlling for country pair …xed e¤ects.   denotes year intercepts that absorb common trade cost shocks.    and  are vectors of coe¢cients to be estimated and    is an error term. A higher value of    should be interpreted as a lower degree of trade integration. To control for possible autocorrelation in each of the individual series of the panel, robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 4-digit NACE Rev.1 level in each country pair (15,145/5 = 3,029 clusters). 27 Geography/Transportation Costs Variables Table 2 reports our main results. Column (1) only includes variables that are related to geography and transportation costs. Across countries, standard 26 The phi -ness of trade is sometimes also de…ned as the square root of bilateral to domestic trade ‡ows (Head and Mayer, 2004) . In that case, the relevant elasticity of substitution would be equal to 2. 27 Our set of determinants is not meant to be exhaustive. There are other possible determinants that we do not consider here such as business and immigration networks (Dunlevy, 2006 , Rauch, 2001 ). gravity variables perform well in explaining the variation in trade frictions. Trade frictions increase with international distances   and decrease with domestic distances   £   , the elasticities being equal to 0.471 and -0.821, respectively. Trade frictions between two contiguous countries (  ) are 7.4 percent lower than between countries that do not share a border and 14 percent lower between two countries that speak the same language   . 28 We also consider proxies of transportation costs that vary across industries. First, we consider the weight-to-value ratio of exports for each industry and year, and averaged across all partners,    . We do not consider bilateral weight-to-value ratios because they are endogenous (they include trade ‡ows that are part of the dependent variable), and they cannot be computed when trade is zero. Overall, since the freight component of trade costs is higher for bulky high weight-to-value raw materials than for manufactures, weight-to-value should be associated with higher values for    . Second, we consider the ratio of c.i.f. and f.o.b. trade values for each industry,    , averaged in each year across all EU partners in order to minimize measurement error (Harrigan, 1993) as well as endogeneity issues, but also because bilateral c.i.f. over f.o.b. trade values cannot be computed when trade is zero. 29 As expected, higher transportation costs as proxied by    and    increase trade frictions with elasticities equal to 0.062 and 0.461, respectively.
Policy Variables
In column (2) we consider the role of several policy-related factors in a¤ecting trade integration. Across countries, we include a dummy variable for Finland and Austria,     , as these two countries were the last in our sample to join the EU (in 1995), and they appear less integrated as    is 23 percent higher compared to the other countries in the sample. We also explore the e¤ect of not adopting the Euro by including a dummy variable,    , which is equal to one for Denmark and the United Kingdom from 2002 onwards when the common currency was introduced. 30 Non-adoption of the Euro had no e¤ect on the extent of trade integration for these two countries since 2002. This result is perhaps explained by the short span of data (2002) (2003) used to investigate the hypothesis, or by anticipation e¤ects.
We also add a variable to capture the e¤ects of the Schengen Agreement which abolishes physical border controls among participating EU countries. The date of the …rst implementation of the agreement di¤ers across countries. Ireland and the United Kingdom have not started implementation yet. The coe¢cient on this variable,   , is negative and highly signi…cant in column (2), suggesting that the abolition of border controls among the participating countries has helped to foster trade integration, most probably through the elimination of time delays and administrative burdens that were previously experienced at borders. Trade frictions between two participating countries are 10 percent lower than between two non-participating countries. And overall, if all countries participated 28 The e¤ects are computed as (exp () ¡ 1) £ 100 percent where  is the estimated coe¢cient. 29 Apart from insurance and other possible discrepancies between partners, the ratio of c.i.f. and f.o.b. for intra-EU trade values mostly captures transportation costs by road. In 1998, 57.8 percent of total intra-EU15 trade went by road, 22.8 percent by sea, 3.9 percent by rail, 3.9 percent by air, 0.9 percent by inland waterways and 0.8 percent by pipeline (European Commission, 2000) . 30 The Euro exchange rates were …xed in 1999 but Euro notes and coins and thus a greater degree of transparency only followed in 2002. The huge literature on the trade-creating e¤ects of currency unions raises the issue of endogeneity of the common currency dummy (Rose, 2000 , Baldwin, 2006 . This issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
in the agreement trade frictions would on average be lower by 1.9 percent. 31 We also consider policy variables that vary across industries. First, we address the role of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs). TBTs result from norms (regulations and standards) that a¤ect the sale of goods in some markets by requiring speci…c product characteristics or production processes. Baldwin (2000) stresses the importance of TBTs in shaping trade ‡ows between countries and industries. He argues that in the case of Europe, such barriers have become more and more visible over time, especially since tari¤ barriers were completely eliminated by 1968. 32 In addition, TBTs are a predominant concern in today's global trade negotiations and for the WTO in particular. Data on TBTs are hard to …nd, however, so our approach to measuring TBTs uses two di¤erent sources of information: a cross-country survey of EU managers who reveal whether they consider TBTs a problem for trade, and a ranking of industries according to the relevance of TBTs. The interacted variable,     , increases with the extent of TBTs across countries and industries. The data appendix provides details and descriptions across countries and industries. In column (2) TBTs are found to lower trade integration, suggesting that some room is left for policy action and that the removal of such barriers might promote trade integration. This result is consistent with Chen (2004) who …nds that TBTs in Europe are associated with larger border e¤ects in international trade.
As is often the case, results based on survey data should be interpreted with caution. In particular, the cross-country measurement of TBTs might be problematic. For instance, if a manager states that TBTs are not a problem, this does not necessarily mean that TBTs are absent or unimportant. Instead, if that manager's company or industry is protected by TBTs initiated by his country, he might actually prefer them. This possibility might bias our cross-country measurement of TBTs. 33 In column (3) we therefore report estimates when only including our industry-speci…c variable on TBTs,    . The results remain consistent, i.e., when TBTs are high, trade integration is low. 34 The results in column (3) indicate that a unit increase in    increases    by 10 percent while the elasticity evaluated at sample mean is equal to 0.191. 35 Most importantly, the complete removal of remaining TBTs would lower    by 9.1 percent (as the sample mean of    is equal to 1.91, for all TBTs to be completely removed    would need to be reduced by 0.91 units to reach a value of 1. This would lower trade frictions by 091£10 = 91 percent). This magnitude is far from negligible and suggests that by removing those barriers policymakers could signi…cantly promote trade integration across industries.
Furthermore, it is well-established that national governments often favor domestic over foreign …rms for some of their purchases, even if foreign suppliers could actually o¤er them a better deal 31 The sample mean of  is equal to 0.81. For all countries to participate in Schengen ( = 1), the variable would need to increase by 0.19 units which would translate into a 019 £ 10 = 19 percent decrease in    . 32 As explained by Baldwin (2000, p. 255) , "Europe's …rst liberalization e¤orts focused on the 'easy' barriers, tari¤s and quotas. With these eliminated by 1968, liberalization attention turned to TBTs."
33 If this were indeed the case, we would underestimate the impact of TBTs so that our coe¢cients could be considered lower-bound estimates. 34 The use of this sectoral variable on TBTs might be criticized on the grounds that it captures changes in TBTs rather than levels (see the data appendix). As in Chen (2004), we experimented using a dummy variable only, which is equal to one when TBTs are present. The results remain una¤ected. 35 This can be calculated as
if calculated at the sample mean of    , which is equal to 1.91. (Davies and Lyons, 1996) . Firms in such "public procurement" markets are hence protected from foreign imports, sometimes to such an extent that trade may be completely suppressed. In the last few years, competition has been steadily increasing in those markets, with the proportion of EU15 public procurement contracts openly advertized in the O¢cial Journal of the EU steadily increasing from 8.4 percent in 1995 to 16.8 percent in 2005 (Eurostat). To investigate whether this opening of markets has helped to lower trade frictions, we rely on time-varying cross-country data on the share of public procurement contracts advertized in the O¢cial Journal. As similar data across industries are not always available, we compute an indicator variable for high public procurement sectors. 36 We interact this indicator variable with the time-varying data for each country, denoting the variable so obtained by     . Column (2) reveals that the opening of public procurement markets to foreign competition has indeed been successful in fostering trade integration across countries, industries and over time. However, the complete liberalization of public procurement markets would lower trade frictions by a modest 0.041 percent only. 37 Next, Value-Added Taxes (VATs), which di¤er extensively across EU countries and goods, are characterized by the so-called "destination principle:" VAT for a good is paid in the country where it is sold, not where it is manufactured, implying that VATs uniformly a¤ect domestic trade and imports. In our model, the imposition of VATs by country  thus increases both domestic costs   and importing costs   by the same proportion, leaving bilateral trade integration    unchanged. In column (2) we include the product of the log of one plus the VAT rate of each partner at the sectoral level,     , and interestingly …nd that higher VATs are associated with signi…cantly lower trade frictions.
One possible interpretation relates to VAT fraud. Baldwin (2006) documents that VAT fraud is a very serious problem in the EU. Since the removal of Europe's internal borders in 1993, trade statistics are now collected by VAT authorities, creating a direct correlation between trade statistics and VAT fraud: EU …rms have an incentive to over-report their exports (to get the VAT rebate) and to under-report their imports (which are subject to VAT). This in ‡ates export statistics relative to import statistics. As a result, in the countries and industries where VATs are high, the value of    might be lower simply because intra-EU export statistics are in ‡ated due to VAT fraud. 38 Other Costs The new trade literature on heterogeneous …rms rationalizes why some …rms export and others do not. In particular, the models by Melitz (2003) , Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and others show that only the most productive …rms participate in foreign markets. Only those …rms are productive enough to cover the …xed costs of exporting or to withstand tough competition on foreign markets. Due to this selection e¤ect we should observe that ceteris paribus, more productive industries trade more on foreign markets than less productive industries, i.e., we should observe a negative relationship between productivity and trade frictions    . In column (4) of Table 2 we 36 Examples of high public procurement industries are "Shipbuilding," "Rail stock," "Pharmaceuticals" or "Aerospace." 37 We calculate the elasticities evaluated at sample means of    with respect to the proportion of public procurement contracts advertized in each of the two partner countries and then compute the total e¤ect on    , assuming that the proportions of public procurement contracts advertized increase to 100 percent in each country (see the data appendix for details on these data).
38 If the intra-EU exports of country  are in ‡ated because of VAT fraud, then    will be high relative to    , leading to a lower value of    . therefore include for each industry and year the average of real labor productivity between trading partners. Moreover, a growing empirical literature shows that as trade costs fall, less e¢cient …rms exit from the market and average industry productivity increases (for example, see Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006 , for the US and Greenaway and Kneller, 2008 , for the UK). To mitigate potential endogeneity problems we lag productivity by one year,    ¡1 , reducing the number of observations by one cross-section. The negative relationship between productivity and    con…rms the prediction that more productive industries trade more on foreign markets (with an elasticity of -0.367).
We also include a dummy variable in column (4) that controls for the three zero trade observations in our sample,    . We …nd that trade frictions between two countries in a given industry are stronger whenever either of them does not export. As models of heterogeneous …rms typically predict that …rms only export if they are able to cover the …xed costs of exporting, the result might re ‡ect the role of these …xed costs.
Controls Finally, we control for some measurement issues and the possibility that the magnitude of    may be a¤ected by the nature of trade. In particular, the value of    computed under intra-industry trade will be lower than under comparative advantage driven by technology or factor endowment di¤erences across countries, even if the actual friction is the same. 39 To control for this potential bias we compute the (absolute) di¤erence in capital shares between countries and industries in order to proxy for di¤erences in factor endowments. For a larger di¤erential in capital shares, trade is more likely based on comparative advantage, leading to an overestimated    . This variable,    , displays the expected positive (but insigni…cant) coe¢cient in column (5) but its inclusion leaves the coe¢cients on the other variables virtually unchanged.
The previous reasoning presumes that di¤erences in factor endowments can be fully captured by di¤erences in capital shares, the latter being computed at the industry level. One obvious limitation stems from the use of data disaggregated at the level of industries and not at the level of products. Industry classi…cations inevitably aggregate many di¤erent types of products into one single category so that the volume of intra-industry trade can appear more important than it actually is. For instance, many di¤erent types of steel are produced, from ‡at-rolled to specialty steels, and it may be that the production of some types of steel requires resources or technologies in which one country has a comparative advantage. However, since all these types of steel are aggregated into one category, it appears as if the countries export and import almost identical products while in reality they export one type of steel and import another type.
Thus, the larger the number of varieties in each industry category, the more likely the industry aggregates trade ‡ows with di¤erent comparative advantages in di¤erent varieties, but in the data this will show up as intra-industry trade, i.e., more balanced trade ‡ows between the two countries. The resulting    is therefore expected to be smaller because the denominator in equation (7) is the product of two more or less balanced (intra-industry) trade ‡ows at the industry level, masking imbalances of (inter-industry) trade ‡ows at the product level. 40 To control for this aggregation bias, we include the number of product categories within each industry,   . In column (5) it is indeed the case that a larger number of varieties is associated with a lower value for    . But the inclusion of this control hardly a¤ects other estimates.
In column (6) we replicate the speci…cation of column (5) but replace the country-varying variable on TBTs by the sectoral variable,    . It is reassuring that all results remain virtually unchanged, providing some evidence that they are not biased by the use of cross-country survey data on TBTs.
Policy Implications
For both regressions in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 , columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 report variance decompositions to illustrate the quantitative contribution of each factor in explaining the variation in the dependent variable. Column (1) in Table 3 shows that regression (5) in Table 2 explains 72 percent of the variation in    . 44 percent can be attributed to the 3-digit industry …xed e¤ects and 0.01 percent to the year …xed e¤ects. Of the 28 percent that the remaining regressors explain, geography and transport costs alone are responsible for about 9 percent of the variation in    , the most important factor being weight-to-value (5.7 percent), followed by bilateral distance (1.7 percent). Policy variables explain 5 percent of the variation in    , which is far from negligible. TBTs are the most important factor (3.2 percent), while the other factors only play minor roles. These policy variables can arguably be in ‡uenced by policymakers. The number of product categories within each industry explains up to 13.9 percent of the variation in    . The decomposition reported in column (2), which corresponds to regression (6) in Table 2 , gives similar results. From a policy perspective, those results suggest that in order to reduce the variance of trade integration across countries and industries, policymakers should give high priority to removing TBTs. Only then should they improve infrastructure policies (associated with the role of distance, assuming that policymakers cannot in ‡uence weight-to-value).
Our Trade Integration Measure Derived from Alternative Models
As we show in equations (8)- (10), the exponent of the trade integration measure is not necessarily a function of the CES substitution elasticity. Instead, it could also be a function of technology parameters, i.e., the Fréchet or Pareto parameters.
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of Fréchet parameter estimates at a …ne level of industry disaggregation that are explicitly based on an Eaton-Kortum type of model. 41 However, we check how our results are a¤ected when using the Pareto shape parameter as a measure of heterogeneity. We obtain the Pareto parameters   from two di¤erent sources and compute a measure of trade 40 The product of two balanced trade ‡ows yields a relatively large magnitude in the denominator and thus a relatively low    . Also, in a model of heterogeneous …rms such as Chaney (2008) integration    as de…ned in (9). 42 The …rst source is Crozet and Koenig (2010) who estimate the Pareto shape parameter   and the elasticity of substitution   for 28 2-digit industries using French …rm-level exports to countries that are contiguous to France. This choice of destination countries is attractive since it …ts fairly well with the EU data that we use. The   's vary between 1.65 and 7.31 with a mean of 3.33 while the   's range from 1.15 to 6.01 with an average of 2.44. Interestingly, the correlation between the two sets of estimates is equal to 95 percent, indicating that the two sources of heterogeneity are strongly correlated.
When regressing the    measure so obtained, we only include 2-digit …xed e¤ects e  because with 3-digit …xed e¤ects the variation in    would become the same as the variation in (inverse) phi-ness within each 3-digit sector as there is no variation in   within 3-digit industries. The sample is also reduced from 163 to 125 industries. The results, reported in column (7) of Table 2, show that both contiguity and public procurement lose signi…cance. From a policy point of view, the variance decomposition reported in column (3) of Table 3 indicates that in addition to TBTs, joining the EU as well as distance are the most important factors in explaining the variance in trade integration. The use of the Pareto parameters estimated by Crozet and Koenig (2010) to measure trade integration therefore leads to results that are broadly similar, albeit with a few di¤erences.
The second source is di Giovanni, Levchenko and Rancière (2011) who estimate   =    (  ¡ 1) for 25 industries using French …rm-level data. The mapping between those estimates and our NACE industries reduces our sample by one industry only. Using our   estimates we indirectly retrieve the   parameters as   =   (  ¡ 1) and use them to compute    . Note that the   's vary across 4-digit NACE sectors thanks to the variation in the   's, and they range from 0.8 to 53.8 with an average of 7.01. 43 The regression for    , reported in column (8) of Table 2 , shows that our results are strongly robust to those   parameters capturing heterogeneity. This consistency in the results also applies to the variance decomposition in column (4) of Table 3 .
To conclude, there is evidence of a strong correlation between the two sources of heterogeneity as measured by   or   . It follows that measuring trade integration using either type of heterogeneity typically leads to similar results.
Comparison to Phi-ness and Gravity
We also illustrate the implications for empirical analysis of the conceptual di¤erence between    on the one hand, and gravity and phi -ness on the other hand. We regress ln
 on the full set of regressors we considered earlier, in which case the estimated trade cost coe¢cients mix the trade barrier and the heterogeneity e¤ects. 44 Compared to    , the results remain similar but 42 The estimation of those parameters remains outside the scope of this paper as it typically requires …rm-level data. Note that the exponent of the trade ‡ow ratio in equation (10) . 43 We use their estimates for non-exporting …rms (see their section 4.3 for an explanation as to why non-exporting …rms should be used). The    1 condition ensures that the size distribution of …rms has a …nite mean in equilibrium but only nine out of the 15  estimates that match with our NACE industries satisfy this condition. Restricting the sample to    1 substantially reduces the number of observations and leads to many right-hand side variables becoming insigni…cant. We therefore include all   's to ensure the comparability between samples. 44 We include year and 3-digit industry …xed e¤ects in both cases. For the gravity equation, domestic outputs are added as regressors and we do not control for multilateral resistance, otherwise variables such as     and    would with a few exceptions (see columns 9 and 10 in Table 2 ). With    , sharing a common border, public procurement and TBTs become insigni…cant. With       , not joining the Euro signi…cantly decreases bilateral trade while VATs are insigni…cant.
Columns (5) and (6) in Table 3 report the variance decompositions corresponding to the regressions in columns (9) and (10) of Table 2 . The policy implications are now di¤erent compared to the ones we derived from    . According to both decompositions, policymakers should not pay much attention to TBTs but should instead focus exclusively on the e¤ects of geography and transportation costs. This …nding suggests that ignoring the role of heterogeneity in measuring trade frictions may generate results that would induce policymakers not to focus on important policy areas.
Robustness
We now report a number of alternative speci…cations that we implement to ensure the robustness of our conclusions. The results can be found in Tables A1 and A2 which are available online. 45 First, we verify in columns (1) and (2) of Table A1 that the results are robust to the inclusion of country pair …xed e¤ects interacted with year dummies and to the exclusion of the series that contain zero trade observations. 46 We also want to make sure that our results are not driven by observations that are economically small. We therefore run a regression in column (3) where the observations are weighted by the product of sectoral bilateral exports in the initial year 1999. Finally, given that Ireland and the United Kingdom are the only two countries that remain outside the Schengen Agreement but are also the only two that are separated from the other countries by a sea, we include in column (4) a control for being an island to make sure that the Schengen variable is not simply capturing the e¤ect of the sea. The results in columns (1) to (4) remain virtually unchanged.
With panel data, one issue relates to the computation of    in real terms. Ideally, for de ‡ating we would need domestic price indices for the numerator and export price indices for the denominator in equation (7). Export price indices are not available, so common practice is to use domestic de ‡ators instead (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) . In that case, the de ‡ators in (7) cancel out and using nominal or real variables yields the same values for    (which is the approach we have followed in the paper). Since there are reasons to believe that domestic and export price indices di¤er from each other, for instance in the case of pricing-to-market practices, we need to tackle this empirical problem up-front.
One way of doing this is to include a set of time-varying sector (3-digit) …xed e¤ects, which leaves our results una¤ected (column 5). A second way is to run cross-sectional regressions for each year, as we do in Table A2 . This approach comes at the cost of considerably reducing the number of observations for each regression so that not all variables are signi…cant in all years, but overall the results largely hold up.
As our main speci…cation includes 3-digit …xed e¤ects, it is important to observe that the variation in    we want to explain is the same as the variation in (inverse) phi-ness if   remains constant within drop out. We also try a speci…cation as in equation (12) with controls for multilateral resistance, dropping the domestic outputs,     and    variables. The policy implications from the variance decomposition remain unchanged. 45 This is available at www.warwick.ac.uk/go/nachen. 46 In the case of zero trade observations, we drop the entire series to keep a balanced sample over time. This results in 12 fewer observations in column (2). a 3-digit sector. 47 In our sample, this happens to 36 industries that do not disaggregate as we move from the 3-digit to the 4-digit level (e.g., "Tobacco products" is the same at the 3-digit and 4-digit levels). 48 It also occurs in "Steel tubes" (NACE 2722) as it is the only 4-digit industry of the 3-digit NACE 272 included in the sample. To ensure that our results are not contaminated by explaining the variation in (inverse) phi-ness in those industries, column (6) excludes the 37 industries from the sample (i.e., 3,175 observations out of 15,145). This leaves our …ndings una¤ected.
Besides, given that the elasticities of substitution   are estimated and not observed, we also compute trade frictions    based on elasticities   plus or minus one standard error. The results are reported in columns (7) and (8) and show that our …ndings remain unchanged.
We also regress a    measure computed using the Imbs and Méjean (2009) and the Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticities. As their estimates display some similarities with our   's, we expect the results to remain broadly similar. As the 3-digit ISIC Rev.3 groupings of Imbs and Méjean (2009) are aggregates of the 4-digit NACE Rev.1 sectors, the mapping of their elasticities from the ISIC to the NACE is pretty accurate (i.e., only 44 ISIC elasticities are required to match 159 of our 163 NACE industries, in which case the sample is reduced by 48 series). But this also means that 3-digit …xed e¤ects cannot be included, otherwise the variation in    to be explained becomes the same as the variation in (inverse) phi-ness within each 3-digit sector. With 2-digit …xed e¤ects e  instead, the regression in column (9) shows that the results remain largely una¤ected. 49 Computing    using the Broda and Weinstein (2006) elasticities is more problematic. The issue comes from the inaccurate aggregation of the 5-digit SITC Rev.3 level elasticities at the 4-digit NACE Rev.1 level as the weights of each SITC product within each NACE sector are unknown (the 163 NACE industries match with 1,555 SITC level elasticities). 50 The NACE level elasticities are thus simply computed as the average of the SITC elasticities. This signi…cantly a¤ects the results as the estimated coe¢cients are sometimes less signi…cant or change sign, and the R-squared is lower (column 10). 51 A …nal concern relates to the exogeneity of lagged productivity in explaining    . We instrument lagged productivity using three instruments (also lagged by one year) which are (mostly) measured for a country that is not in our sample, i.e., the US. We believe that such data, in addition to being arguably exogenous, should provide some useful information about the productivity distribution across EU industries. First, we use sectoral real labor productivity for the US. Second, as increasing returns to scale would suggest a positive e¤ect of …rm size on productivity, we consider average …rm size for US industries (missing observations reduce the sample by 14 series). Third, we compute the US shares of R&D spending in sectoral value-added. In order to instrument the cross-country variation in productivity, we further interact the US shares of R&D spending with aggregate R&D spending as 47 This explains why 4-digit …xed e¤ects cannot be included in equation (16) as   varies across 4-digit industries only. 48 Those industries can be identi…ed in Table 1 by a NACE code ending with a zero. 49 The results remain unchanged if we further restrict the sample to the 2-digit industries within which there is some variation in   . This reduces the sample by 19 industries or 895 observations. 50 The matching is achieved using correspondence tables from the SITC Rev.3 to the ISIC Rev.3 and from the ISIC Rev.3 to the NACE Rev.1 level.
51 Hummels (2001a) uses data on bilateral trade ‡ows, import tari¤s and transport costs to estimate substitution elasticities at the 2-digit SITC Rev.3 level. Our results also remain robust to the use of those elasticities in computing    . a proportion of GDP for each of the EU partners. Overall, the …rst-stage regression explains up to 64 percent of the variation in sectoral EU productivity, and column (11) shows that our results remain robust to Instrumental Variables. 52
Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the sources and size of trade barriers across countries and industries. For this purpose we employ the monopolistic competition gravity framework by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) with heterogeneous trade costs and heterogeneous elasticities of substitution across industries. The model yields a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade integration that nets out multilateral resistance terms, controls for cross-industry heterogeneity and can be computed as a function of observable trade and output data only. We show that this trade integration measure is also consistent with other classes of models including the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and recent heterogeneous …rms models.
In the empirical part of the paper, we use data for 163 manufacturing industries across the European Union for the years 1999 to 2003. We …rst estimate the elasticities of substitution across industries since these are required to construct the trade integration measure. We …nd a substantial degree of heterogeneity across industries both for the substitution elasticities and the degree of trade integration. For example, trade integration appears particularly low for industries characterized by high transportation costs such as "Bricks," "Plaster" and "Cement." On the contrary, those industries where trade costs do not appear to be an important consideration include a number of high-tech industries such as "Aircraft and spacecraft," "Engines and turbines" or "Computers."
We also relate our trade integration measure to observable trade cost proxies. In particular, we show that cross-country trade integration is lower for those countries that joined the EU most recently and that have not yet implemented the Schengen Agreement that abolishes physical border controls. Most importantly, we also document a considerable variation in trade integration across industries. Trade integration is hampered by transportation costs as captured by industry-speci…c weight-to-value and c.i.f./f.o.b. ratios. Trade integration is also severely hampered by policy factors, in particular Technical Barriers to Trade and intransparent public procurement procedures. For public policy our …ndings suggest that gains from improved international trade integration are possible especially through the elimination of TBTs.
Of course, ultimately even highly disaggregated industry-level data "can never be as …ne as reality, so some degree of aggregation bias is inevitable" (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, p. 729) . Thus, the use of industry-level data precludes us from exploring trade impediments at the …rm or product level. In our view, analyzing trade barriers at these very …ne levels of disaggregation would be a natural and important next step. while an asterisk ( ¤ ) indicates that the elasticity is obtained by a grid search algorithm. "rank" provides the ranking of each 4-digit industry from the largest to the smallest value of   and   , respectively. Notes: The variance decompositions are calculated according to Fields (2003) . The contribution of each explanatory variable  to the total variance of a dependent variable  is given by  =    (  )  ( ) where   is the partial regression coe¢cient of  on the explanatory variable   (holding all other explanatory variables constant). The decompositions in columns (1) to (6) correspond to regressions (5) to (10) in Table 2 . The contributions sum to 100 percent. 
